Robert Pál-Wallin (LU) will present his research at the Higher Semina in practical philosophy.

It will be a so-called close reading seminar and participants are therefore expected to carefully read his paper in advance. The paper will be shared in due time.

Abstract:

Against Alethic Views of Moral Responsibility

Alethic views of moral responsibility state that an agent A is morally responsible for j if and only if it is fitting to have some negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of j. Proponents of Alethic views subsequently argue that since all emotions are at least partly constituted by mental states with a mind-to-world direction of fit, the fittingness of the relevant reactive emotions will be a function of the accuracy of their embedded representational content. For example, suppose that resentment towards A involves the representational content R which is the conjunction of three further thoughts x, y and z. The Alethic view of moral responsibility then yields the verdict that insofar as x, y and z are all true of A and A’s j-ing, resentment towards A is fitting which entails that A is morally responsible for j-ing. Although I agree with advocates of the Alethic view that we should try to understand moral responsibility in terms of fitting emotions, I will in this paper argue that the way in which they try to do it – by appealing to representational accuracy – is misguided. Instead, I will propose an understanding of moral responsibility in terms of fitting emotions which takes seriously the idea that emotions are felt attitudinal engagements with distinct profiles.